The items listed in the lefthand column can be chosen as goals of life (obviously they are not the only ones) for the individual and society. The items in the righthand column cannot be chosen simply for their own sakes, but only as means to an end or as escapes from evils, as is the case with suicide. If someone chooses one or other of them, we ask what good he hopes to gain from choosing something not in itself choiceworthy. We do not ask that question about people who choose the objects listed in the opposite column.
The emancipated self so popular in intellectual circles today likes to believe that the objects of his choices are good because he has chosen them, and that he could, if he so chose, just as well make the opposite choices. He is the ultimate pro-choicer. But if he chose all of the objects in the righthand list, he would destroy himself (even if he left death to the end of the list), and if he did not choose all of them, he would merely delay his final self-destruction or at least self distortion.
Similarly, a perfectly liberal society based on the sovereignty of will and the supremacy of individual choice would neither flourish nor last long. The true goals of life are good, not because we have chosen them but because they correspond to the basic needs of human nature, without which it cannot survive or develop.
There are, therefore, natural goals of man and society that must govern public decision making. We may and we surely shall disagree about many of the conclusions regarding both ends and means that follow from the natural goals of society. Natural law does not proceed more geometrico as if it were an exercise in geometry, where the conclusions follow with logical necessity from the postulated premises.
The seventeenth century did natural law a great disservice by assuming that an essentially mathematical mode of reasoning was the proper model of human thought. "General and certain truths are only founded in the habitudes and relations of abstract ideas," said John Locke, and added, "The idea of a Supreme Being . . . and the idea of ourselves, as understanding rational beings . . . would, I suppose, if duly considered and pursued, afford such foundations of our duty and rules of action, as might place morality amongst the sciences capable of demonstration." Locke never succeeded in demonstrating such a science of morahty for the good reason that it cannot be done. Instead, the effort to build morality on the foundation of abstract ideas eventually destroyed recognition of concrete, existing human nature as the norm of moral thought and issued in utilitarianism.
We are faced today with what Alasdair Maclntyre has called "the pluralism which threatens to destroy us all." It is not merely the diversity of race, ethnic ancestry, and religion that now constitutes our pluralism. It is the disintegration of our cultural consensus and our growing inability to agree on even basic principles of moral conduct. Politicians and journalists understandably want to keep moral issues out of politics, because they fear that the poUtical system cannot deal with them without degenerating into violence. They naturally prefer "normal politics," that is, a politics concerned with taxing and spending. But the moral issues will not go away. They touch people's lives too deeply; they shape the culture in which people must live and raise their children; and the state cannot forever pretend to be neutral about those issues.
The sense of moral breakdown in our society is growing among large sectors of the American people. There was a time when, underneath the diversity of religious denominations in this country, there was widespread agreement on the moral beliefs that most directly affected social policy. The large majority of the denominations were religions of the Bible and taught the Ten Commandments. Even the unbelievers still lived to a large extent on an inherited moral capital. Now, whether we celebrate it as a liberation or deplore it as a social crisis, the former consensus is disappearing, and profound disagreements about not only moral principles, but about the fundamental ideas of the nature of the world, of man, and of society that supported the principles, are coming to the surface.
In dealing with this cultural disintegration, it will not be enough to yield to the standard liberal plea for tolerance. In our society, as we have seen for some decades now, tolerance means that a secularized, materialistic, and hedonistic elite gets to write the script and make the rules for the whole society. "It must be left to them," we are endlessly told in the media, the courtrooms, and the universities, for the sake of the individual's expanding right to choose his own lifestyle, balanced only by "compelling state interests."
Those interests will necessarily be material ones because, since we do not agree on moral issues, we can agree only on society's material needs. Such will be, for example, the prevention and cure of disease, e.g., AIDS (but without infringing on "gay rights"), a public education purged of any trace of morality derived from religion, and anti-discrimination laws that limit the right of private institutions to uphold their own moral standards. The result is a neutrality of the state that is heavily biased toward secular liberal values. The pluralist game thus becomes a confidence game in which the rest of us are gulled into buying a secular liberal bill of goods.
The first thing we must do is to refuse to accept the liberal definition of the point at issue in our political and cultural debates. We have a secular state, but it is not therefore a secularist one. We are divided in religion, but we do not have to act as if we were all agnostics and moral relativists when we enter the public forum. We believe in human rights, but we need not subscribe to a radically individualistic theory of rights.
In particular, we ought not feel obliged to agree with the U.S. Supreme Court's interpretation of the word "liberty" in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court has turned that word into a never-failing fountain of rights that are not found in the text of the Constitution. In so doing, as Justice Hugo Black said in his dissenting opinion in the case of Griswold v. Connecticut in 1965, the Court has bestowed upon itself a "broad unbounded judicial authority" which amounts to "a great unconstitutional shift of power [from legislatures] to the courts." As Justice Black feared, the Court has politicized itself and lost its credibility. Constitutional law is now politics pursued by other means.
There is little that we, the people, can do directly about the Court's decisions but, to borrow some favorite terms from the liberals, we can leani to adopt a critical, questioning attitude toward them, and to doubt their constitutional authority. More broadly, we can learn to doubt the liberal orthodoxy that teaches us that liberal individualism is the necessary foundation of limited, constitutional government.
We are engaged in a culture war, and the least we can do is to recognize that it is a war or, if that term seems too dramatic, a vast cultural shift. It need not be accepted merely because it is happening; it can and should be resisted. The resistance must take place on the level of pohtics and law, but in the essential respects not primarily there. The remedy for our cultural ills cannot by furnished by laws, useful though they undoubtedly will be.
More basically, our society needs a moral conversion. That in turn will depend upon a philosophical conversion that will allow us to be confident of our ability to make objectively valid, moral judgments. We need, as Thomas Spragens, Jr. phrases it, "the recovery of the rather well-worn notion that there is such a thing as 'human nature.'" Furthermore, we must insist that our nature does not realize itself in the "unencumbered self," all of whose relations to others are external, contractual, and chosen for essentially private motives.
We must think of man as by nature relational, a being whose relations are either built into his nature or, if conventional, are ones that, to be morally acceptable, must be in harmony with his nature and tend to fulfill and develop it. Such a nature has its proper natural goods, which go beyond merely individual goods and form the common good of communities that satisfy the needs of human nature. No atomistic, empiricist, or nominalist view of nature will furnish an adequate basis for that philosophy; only a philosophical realism will do.
I doubt if a purely philosophical conversion will be enough. It will have to be in some way a religious one, if only because, as said above, a universe created by a personal God can supply the sense of meaning, purpose, and obligation that are necessary to a viable moral order. To do the good, it is necessary to love it, and love is not engendered by knowledge alone. Besides, as St. Augustine said, nisi credideritis, non intelligetis, unless you believe, you will not understand.
I think St. Augustine was right, but I am not suggesting that we begin the restoration of moral order in our country by making a philosophical or religious conversion our primary objective. Given the kind of pluralism we now have, such an effort would be foredoomed to failure. Perhaps it is were better to begin at the foot of the mountain, with the natural goods that ordinary decent people can most readily be brought to agree upon despite their varying convictions and beliefs and to work upward from there.
Whether or not they come to agree entirely on the highest philosophical and/or religious premises of a public morality, many of them will agree (as they already do) on a range of moral goods that furnish society with goals of public as well as private life. They are listed above: life, health, nourishment, material well-being, love, community, respect, friendship, marriage, family, knowledge, truth, meaning, and whatever other objects can reasonably be taken as natural human goods. These are the goals that can be the organizing principles of life, both for individuals and communities.
Many conservative reviewers criticized George Will's book. Statecraft as Soulcraft, when he published it in 1983 because they thought he was proposing that government take on the role of forming the moral character of the citizens. His point was a more subtle one, namely, that governmental policies in fact affect the moral character of citizens, and both government and the citizens ought to be aware of that and judge the policies accordingly. But the citizens cannot be effective critics of the moral effect of public policies unless a sufficient number of them have commonly held moral standards and are not rendered inarticulate by contemporary skepticism and relativism. They need, in short, the kind of solid moral convictions furnished by natural law or something very much like it.
It is emphatically not necessary to convince the skeptics and relativists, or to persuade the rugged individualists before we can proceed. The democratic process does not depend on unanimity, and individual rights, valuable though they are, do not always trump the claims of community. In this country the democratic process operates, insofar as the courts will permit it, on the assumption that among the people there is what the Middle Ages called the major et sanior pars, the larger and sounder part that is qualified to govern, not because it is larger but because it is presumed to be normally saner and sounder. It is the conscience of that part of the people that advocates of natural law must appeal to.
Natural Law and Constitutional Law
-by Gerard V. Bradley A distinguishing feature of the natural law, as Catholics have always understood it, is the set of exceptionless negative moral norms, including that against intentionally killing the innocent. These norms constitute the superstructure of the Christian moral life. They also serve as a ramp to heaven for non-Christians. As the Holy Father made so powerfully clear in the encyclical Veritatis Splendor [VS] , when we preach the Gospel we preach the good news of salvation through Jesus. "It is precisely on the path of the moral life that the way of salvation is open to all:' [VS §3, emphasis in original] The moral truth is thus the path to salvation for those who.
